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THE POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS OF 
AMENDING CLAUSES* 
Sanford Levinson** 
Imagine two written constitutions.! One sets out political 
structures and governmental empowerments and limitations; it 
concludes with a clause saying: "Anything in this constitution 
may be changed by the passage of ordinary legislation as spelled 
out in this constitution." To take the best known example, at 
least to Americans, this would allow change in the case of the 
United States Constitution by agreement of majorities in both 
houses of Congress and assent by the President or by a two-
thirds vote in each house overriding a presidential veto. Our sec-
ond constitution comes to a radically different conclusion: "[This] 
fundamental constitution[ ] ... shall be and remain the sacred 
and unalterable form and rule of government ... forever."2 
What can one say about these two constitutional schemes? 
As to the first, one might be tempted to say that the polity 
described really doesn't have a "constitution" at all, at least if a 
"constitution" is in some ways supposed to stand "above" and in 
some sense even "outside" the everyday system of ordinary polit-
ical decisionmaking. Thus Mark Thshnet has recently written 
that "[p]erhaps some degree of institutional stability is required 
for a system to warrant the name constitutional, which suggests 
* The original version of this essay was prepared for a conference on 
"Constitutions and Constitutionalism," sponsored by the Murphy Institute of Political 
Economy, Tulane University, New Orleans, Louisiana, March 11-12, 1995. Subsequent 
versions were presented to the Constitutional Studies Colloquium of the University of 
Texas Law School and Government Department and to the faculty colloquium at the 
Fordham University School of Law. I am grateful to Jim Fleming, Doug Laycock, Hans 
Linde, Scot Powe, and Eugene Volokh for comments on earlier drafts of this essay, as well 
as for suggestions received from the participants at the Murphy Institute conference. 
** W. St. John Garwood and W. St. John Garwood, Jr. Regents Chair in Law, Uni-
versity of Texas Law School. 
1. The adjective is important, for it is obvious that all political systems can be said 
to have "constitutions" in the sense of constitutive conventions of practice and tradition. 
Yet most-all but seven current states, in fact-have chosen to have written constitutions, 
and this paper concerns only such systems and some of the problems attached to "putting 
it in writing." 
2. From The Fundamental Constitutions of Carolina§ 120 (drafted by John Locke), 
microformed on English Books (1641-1700), Wing Reel154 (University Microfilms, Inc.). 
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that it should not be too easy to amend all of a constitution's 
provisions, or perhaps any of its basic institutional prescrip-
tions."J From this perspective, then, the first "constitution" isba-
sically an initiating statute that is thoroughly "inside" the 
ordinary political order. 
It is "inside" in a double sense: First, its mechanism for 
change differs not at all from the standard-form politics of legis-
lation. Secondly, only those already inside the political system-
i.e., elected officials-participate in the decision-making process, 
a point to which I shall return later. To be sure, even this consti-
tution might in fact be difficult to change insofar as ordinary leg-
islation is itself difficult to pass, as is the case in the notoriously 
complex system established by the United States Constitution, 
with its bicameral legislature and independent role for the Presi-
dent (not to mention the political implications of federalism and 
consequent hindrances to the establishment of a truly united na-
tional party system). But one can easily imagine alternatives to 
our present political structure, which has, indeed, been adopted 
by no other country in the world. One would, for example, pre-
dict both more legislation and more amendment in unicameral 
than in bicameral systems; similarly, one assumes that passage 
would be easier if the president (or monarch) played no role, 
especially when the formal system, as in the United States or 
France, for example, tolerates the possibility of an executive and 
legislature controlled by different political parties. 
Perhaps even this "minimalist" constitution might have 
some special prestige because of the stature of its authors and the 
concomitant cultural hesitation to amend their handiwork. 
There is no logical reason why it could not receive the "venera-
tion" thought by James Madison to be so important to the consti-
tutional enterprise,4 although, as an empirical matter, it may be 
that such "veneration" is, to some extent, a function of the diffi-
culty of amendment. Cognitive dissonance theory might predict, 
for example, that one will tend to adjust and even find merit in 
structures that are in fact difficult to change, and the absence of 
difficulty might lead to a reduced level of affective commitment. 
In any event, this hypothesized constitution presents no spe-
cial obstacles to its own change. A bicameral system could, for 
example, become unicameral so long as both houses agreed to 
the change, the presidency could simply be abolished and re-
3. See Mark Thshnet, The Whole Thing, 11 Const. Comm. 223, 225 (1995). 
4. See Sanford Levinson, "Veneration" and Constitutional Change: James Madison 
Confronts the Possibility of Constitutional Amendment, 21 Tex. Tech. L. Rev. 2443 (1990). 
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placed with a prime minister drawn from the legislature, and so 
on. Should we discover, after a suitable passage of time, that this 
constitution had remained unchanged we would, I think, be enti-
tled to offer the lack of change as evidence of very high satisfac-
tion, at least on the part of ruling elites, in regard to the original 
scheme. 
The second constitution is, of course, at the opposite ex-
treme. It announces its own imperviousness to change. Even the 
most modest change-at least where "change" is defined as for-
mal amendment-would presumably require its "overthrow" in-
asmuch as modification of the text has been rendered impossible. 
Evidence of lack of formal change could be submitted only for 
the proposition that dissatisfaction had not risen to such a fever 
pitch that regime overthrow was found to be preferable to con-
tinuation of the system established by the constitution. It would, 
however, be foolhardy in the extreme to view non-amendment as 
any more positive an endorsement or reaffirmation than that. 
Such a "perpetual," formally unamendable, constitutional 
structure would, moreover, force us to confront a subject of great 
theoretical importance: How precisely do we identify constitu-
tional amendments? As Stephen Griffin, among others, has well 
pointed out, an ever-present alternative to formal amendment is 
informal amendments Least likely in a dynamic political system 
is no amendment, whether or not these changes take canonical 
textual form. Indeed, Noam Zohar, a young Israeli philosopher, 
has analyzed the theoretical problem of amendment within Jew-
ish halacha, which lacks any formal process of amendment. Af-
ter all, halacha is based on divine revelation, and it is untenable, 
both practically and perhaps even theologically, to suppose that 
God would have committed errors subject to correction by falli-
ble humans. Yet Zohar points out that there is certainly a great 
deal of significant change in Jewish law, though it is almost never 
described as "amendment. "6 
I believe, therefore, that it is naive to identify "amendment" 
only as formal textual additions (or subtractions). Only an athe-
oretical person can confidently assert that the United States Con-
5. See Constitutionalism in the United States: From Theory to Politics, in Sanford 
Levinson, ed., Responding to Imperfection: The Theory and Practice of Constitutional 
Amendment 37-62 (Princeton U. Press, 1995) ("Imperfection"). See also the superb essay 
by DonaldS. Lutz, Toward a Theory of Constitutional Amendment, in id. at 237-74. 
6. See Noam J. Zohar, Midrash: Amendment through the Molding of Meaning, in 
id. at 307-18. 
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stitution has exactly 27 amendments.? Moreover, one function of 
such almost literally thoughtless confidence is to blind us to the 
reality of non-Article V amendment within our own constitu-
tional system.s In that sense, emphasis on Article V as the 
source of all amendments is truly ideological, reinforcing a cer-
tain kind of political understanding and promoting a false con-
sciousness about our political reality. 
Bruce Ackerman has been the most notable proponent of 
the presence of non-Article V (and non-textual) amendments 
within what any well-trained lawyer would today identify as "the 
United States Constitution."9 He earlier focused on changes in 
the "domestic" power of the national government surrounding 
the post-Civil War period and the New Deal; most recently he 
has turned his attention to foreign affairs. He thus argues that 
the approval of the North American Free Trade and GATT 
agreements by majorities of both houses of Congress, rather than 
by two-thirds of the Senate, where the 1787 Constitution reposed 
the power to ratify treaties, is evidence of a profound "structural 
amendment" provoked by World War II and its aftermath.1o 
Still, even if one believes that it is foolish to assert that only 
formal changes count as amendments, it would be perverse to 
reject the importance of formal amending structures or of the 
formal additions to, and subtractions from, constitutional text. 
At the very least, any legal culture, like our own, that includes 
textual argument among the array of lawyerly rhetorics or modal-
7. Jim Fleming has suggested to me that "a theoretical person certainly can assert 
this." It might be a "bad" theory, but "bad theorizing is not being atheoretical." There is 
certainly something to this. It is the case, though, that most people who offer the "confi-
dent" assertion suggested in the text are not theorists at all. That is, I think they are 
simply repeating a conventional wisdom that has been insufficiently theorized. I also be-
lieve that if they subject that conventional wisdom to theoretical analysis, then they will in 
fact reject the identification of "amendment" with "numbered textual additions." 
8. See Sanford Levinson, How Many Times Has the United Stales Constitution Been 
Amended? (A) <26; (B) 26; (C) 27; (D) >27, in Imperfection at 13-36 (cited in note 5). 
For our purposes, I put to one side the difficulties in counting the 18th and 21st Amend-
ments-one might well argue, for example, that the 18th Amendment, having been re-
pealed, is therefore not part of the Constitution at all-and the question of whether the 
27th Amendment was properly ratified. On this latter issue, see Sanford Levinson, Au-
thorizing Constitutional Text: On the Purported Twenty-Seventh Amendment, 11 Const. 
Comm. 101 (1994). 
9. See, e.g., Bruce Ackerman, We the People: FoundaJions (Harvard U. Press, 
1991). 
10. See Bruce Ackerman and David Golove, Is NAFTA Constitutional?, 108 Harv. 
L. Rev. 799 (1995) (forthcoming in hardback with Harvard University Press). Laurence 
Tribe scathingly attacks the Ackerman-Golove analysis in Taking Text and Structure Seri-
ously: Reflections on Free-Form Method in Constitutional Interpretation, 108 Harv. L. Rev. 
1221 (1995). 
1996] AMENDING CLAUSES 111 
itiesn must appreciate the advantage of being able to refer to 
specific text rather than having to make what some analysts 
would dismiss as appeals to "unwritten" general traditions or 
conventions. Opponents of President Bush's policy in the Per-
sian Gulf were certainly helped by the presence of the declara-
tion-of-war clause in Article I of the Constitution, and they 
would, concomitantly, have been significantly hindered had the 
"power to declare war" been placed in Article II. 
Needless to say, to note the importance of text does notre-
quire that one believe either that texts are self-interpreting or 
that textual argument will necessarily prevail over, say, doctrinal 
or prudential argument. Still, it is impossible to believe that any-
one in our legal culture (or others with written constitutions) be-
lieves that text is truly irrelevant. Otherwise why would one care 
whether, for example, a balanced budget amendment or any 
other proposal was in fact adopted? Similarly, the importance of 
text in our constitutional tradition presumably explains why sup-
porters of equal rights for women committed themselves to the 
Equal Rights Amendment, even though few were willing to ex-
plain precisely what rights it would add beyond those already 
protected by (their version of) the Equal Protection Clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment. Sophisticated post-structuralist cri-
tiques of the sufficiency of text do not at all negate the practical 
importance of texts within everyday political life. 
Anyone thinking about constitutional design-consider, for 
example, someone flying to Eastern Europe or elsewhere to offer 
advice about constitutional design-must therefore address pro-
cedures for amendment every bit as much as the standard topics 
of institutional design.12 Indeed, few topics are more important, 
whether as a theoretical or practical matter, than amendment 
clauses. 
I return to our two model constitutions that establish the 
two ends of a spectrum. What might lead to adoption of one or 
the other of these two admitted extremes? To adopt the title of a 
recent book that I have edited, Responding to Imperfection, let 
me suggest that the authors of the first constitution would be 
maximally modest as to their own capabilities and maximally 
11. See Philip Bobbitt, Constitutional Fate (Oxford U. Press, 1982); Constitutional 
Interpretation (Blackwell, 1991), which develop the notion of American constitutional law 
being constituted by specific rhetorical modalities, one of which is reliance on the explicit 
text of the Constitution. 
12. For an excellent discussion, see Stephen Holmes and Cass R. Sunstein, The Poli-
tics of Constitutional Revision in Eastern Europe, in Imperfection at 275-306 (cited in note 
5). 
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aware of their capacity for imperfect judgments. That is, they 
would acknowledge the relatively high probability that their no-
tions of proper government, whether one is referring to institu-
tional design or the authorization or prohibition of specific 
powers, are in fact subject to error, given the complexities of 
political life. 
Consider the statement of Virginia's George Mason on June 
11, 1787, as he opened the debate in Philadelphia on what 
amending procedure the delegates should adopt for the Constitu-
tion taking form that summer. "The plan now to be formed will 
certainly be defective," he told his fellow delegates. "Amend-
ments therefore will be necessary, and it will be better to provide 
for them, in an easy, regular and Constitutional way than to trust 
to chance and violence. "13 Indeed, I drew the title Responding to 
Imperfection from a comment by Mason's fellow Virginian 
George Washington to his nephew, Bushrod Washington: "The 
warmest friends and the best supporters the Constitution has, do 
not contend that it is free from imperfections; but they found 
them unavoidable and are sensible if evil is likely to arise there 
from, the remedy must come hereafter."t4 
Those who accentuate the possibility of imperfection and 
adopt what might be termed a "statutory" mode of amendment 
accept the twin likelihoods as well, first, that future generations 
are likely to recognize the existence of these imperfections and, 
secondly, that these generations will be sagacious enough to cor-
rect them. In tum these successor generations will presumably 
also be wise enough to realize that they, too, will be imperfect in 
their political judgments and thus leave it open to their successors 
to engage in the same presumptively progressive response to im-
perfections, and so on ad infinitum. Thus, all successor genera-
tions would presumably feel empowered to change the 
constitutional rules whenever that seemed to be a good idea. 
Needless to say, such confidence was not expressed by Washing-
ton or his colleagues in Philadelphia, a fact to which I will return 
in the second half of this essay. 
The second constitution would presumably be authored by 
persons who had an inordinate confidence in their own political 
wisdom coupled perhaps with an equally inordinate lack of confi-
dence in successor generations. Locke's use of the word "sacred" 
13. Max Farrand, ed., 1 The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787 at 202-03 
(Yale U. Press, 1966) (emphasis added). 
14. Michael Kammen. ed., The Origins of the American Constitution: A Documen-
tary History 83 (Penguin Books, 1986). 
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may be telling, moreover, insofar as it suggests a self-perception 
by the framers of themselves as (at least) demigods, whose work 
is entitled to the same awesome respect as that given "real" gods. 
Although one might think that the first constitution is maxi-
mally open to change, that is not the case. One can imagine a 
third constitution that concludes not only with the postulated 
sentence but, in addition, states that "this constitution can also be 
amended by majoritarian popular referendum on initiatives pro-
pounded by 5% of the population." What political presupposi-
tions might account for this addition? 
One obvious answer is that the framers are familiar with 
contemporary public choice theory and its concern about 
"agency costs." That is, to limit constitutional amendment only 
to what gains the assent of those already ensconced within gov-
ernmental institutions is, almost by definition, to lessen the possi-
bility that the occupants of political office will be amenable to 
proposals that would significantly affect their interests or, in the 
language of public choice, diminish the possibility of engaging in 
successful rent-seeking for themselves and their supporters.1s 
One does not have to be modern to have this insight. Again 
one can turn to George Mason, who vigorously opposed initial 
drafts of Article V that placed exclusive power to initiate amend-
ments in the hands of Congress. "As the proposing of amend-
ments is ... to depend ... ultimately, on Congress, no 
amendments of the proper kind would ever be obtained by the 
people, if the Government should become oppressive, as he ver-
ily believed would be the case. "16 It was therefore vital to create 
alternatives to Congress as the possible progenitors of constitu-
tional amendments. Mason's opposite was New York's Alexan-
der Hamilton, who trusted the States no more than Mason 
trusted Congress. After all, said this highest of Federalists, "The 
State Legislatures will not apply for alterations but with a view to 
increase their own powers"11 and, presumably, weaken those of 
the national government. The solution found in Article V seems 
to address both of their concerns: Hamilton won the right of 
Congress to propose amendments, but Mason won the right of 
states to initiate a new constitutional convention upon petition of 
two-thirds of the states. 
15. See Donald J. Boudreaux and A.C. Pritchard, Rewriting the Constitution: An 
Economic Analysis of the Constitutional Amendment Process, 62 Fordham L. Rev. 111 
(1993). 
16. Philip B. Kurland and Ralph Lerner, eds., 4 The Founders' Constitution 577 (U. 
of Chicago Press, 1987). 
17. Id. 
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This latter mode of amendment has, of course, never in fact 
been undertaken, at least beyond petitions by various states that 
a constitutional convention be called.lB Most mainstream ana-
lysts seem frightened to death by the very possibility, though I 
confess I do not share this view. In this regard, it would be espe-
cially helpful to recognize that the United States in fact includes 
51 constitutions within its territory and to study the propensity of 
states to subject their constitutions to the more-or-less frequent 
scrutiny of constitutional conventions. Some analysts have re-
cently argued that state constitutions are not "real" constitutions 
precisely because they are so little blessed by the "veneration" 
visited upon the national constitution, but this obviously begs 
the question as to how precisely we identify something as a 
constitution.19 
It is also worth mentioning in this context the powerful argu-
ment of Akhil Reed Amar that the American idea of popular 
sovereignty requires the possibility that the United States consti-
tution be amendable by a majority of voters in a popular referen-
dum, in addition to the supermajoritarian procedures set out in 
Article V.2o Even though, as a practical matter, Amar's method 
is not only untried but also, for most Americans, I suspect un-
thinkable, his argument is noteworthy insofar as it is built on see-
ing the role of Article V as protecting the people en masse 
against the corruption of their political agents rather than neces-
sarily endorsing the political status quo itself. Thus for Amar the 
Article V requirement of extraordinary majorities in both houses 
of Congress and state legislatures is far less a commitment to the 
perfection of the existing constitutional scheme than an expres-
sion of the deep mistrust of political actors and fear that too-easy 
methods of change would provide simply a royal road to rent-
seeking. 
18. See Michael Stokes Paulsen, A General Theory of Article V: The Constitutional 
Lessons of the Twenty-Seventh Amendment, 103 Yale L.J. 677, 764 (1993); Bruce M. Van 
Sickle and Lynn M. Boughey, A Lawful and Peaceful Revolution: Article V and Congress' 
Present Duty to Call a Convention for Proposing Amendments, 14 Hamline L. Rev. 1, 46-
56 (1990) 
19. See, e.g., James A. Gardner, The Failed Discourse of State Constitutionalism, 90 
Mich. L. Rev. 761 (1992); Hans A. Linde, State Constitutions Are Not Common Law: 
Comments on Gardner's Failed Discourse, 24 Rutgers L.J. 927 (1993). It would be inter-
esting to see how many national constitutions would survive the tests imposed by those 
who reject the "constitutionness" of, say, the Illinois or New York constitutions. There is, 
to put it mildly, something distinctly odd about a theory of constitution-identity that 
would exclude most documents titled "the constitution of X." 
20. See Popular Sovereignty and Constitutional Amendment, in Imperfection at 89-
115 (cited in note 5). 
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Even the Article V possibility of convention-by-call-of-the-
states does not entirely overcome the agency problem, for one 
might imagine circumstances when all political officials, regard-
less of the level of office held, would have interests in common 
against the civilian populace. Thus perhaps the Western states-
most (in)famously California-teach an essential lesson by offer-
ing the possibility of amendment by direct initiative and referen-
dum of the sovereign People themselves, freed of any 
requirement to beseech political intermediaries for their substan-
tive approval (though some intermediaries must still presumably 
agree to place the measures on some official ballot and then to 
count the votes).2t For what it is worth, it is not only the fevered 
states of the American West who have rejected the monopoliza-
tion of amendment by state officials. Switzerland, presumably a 
symbol of boring stability, has been described as "the only nation 
in the world where political life truly revolves around the refer-
endum. . . . The great political moments of modem Switzerland 
have occurred not in the following of bold statesmen but in the 
national debates that have drawn the masses to the polls to de-
cide their country's future."n 
What must one believe to endorse direct initiative and refer-
endum as a mechanism of constitutional amendment? At the 
very least, support of any such scheme of amendment seems to 
require an unusually high, some might say paranoid, mistrust 
even of popularly-elected agents, who will presumably be cor-
rupted once they take their seats in Washington, Sacramento, Al-
bany, or Budapest, coupled with an equally remarkable, neo-
Rousseauian faith in an uncorrupted People.23 To adopt an initi-
ative-and-referendum system like California's is, in addition, to 
21. See, e.g., Cal Canst, Art. II, § 8; Ariz Canst, Art IV, pt. 1, § 1; Mont Const, Art. 
XIV,§ 9. 
22. Kris W. Kobach, Switzerland, in David Butler and Austin Ranney, Referendums 
Around the World: the Growing Use of Direct Democracy 98 (The AEI Press, 1994). 
23. Eugene Volokh has challenged my imputation to paranoid mistrust of popular 
agents as the motive force for reliance on initiatives. "The legislative process," he argues 
in a December 6, 1995, e-mail message, will often allow 
minorities who care deeply about a subject to overcome the will of majorities 
who care less deeply. This might, for instance, be why the anti-affirmative action 
campaigns are being waged more on the initiative front than the legislative front: 
If the minority that is pro-affirmative action is very passionate about its support, 
and the majority that is anti is more lukewarm in its opposition, then a legisla-
tor-a repeat player-may prefer to vote for affirmative action and mildly alien-
ate the majority than vote against and strongly alienate the minority. And, of 
course, the minority will be able to cut legislative deals that it can't with the 
initiative. 
This feature of the legislative process may often be a good thing, but I can 
see someone arguing that it isn't always-that there ought to be a mechanism 
for majority sentiments, even those more weakly held, to prevail over strongly 
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reject the importance placed by Madison on representative gov-
ernment and on multiple filters between the mass of the electo-
rate and ultimate political outcomes. These filters, of course, 
range from the ostensibly virtuous characters of those likely to be 
elected to office to the encouragement of certain kinds of delib-
eration by the rules or practices of our political institutions. In-
deed, it is just this escape from the filtration of republican 
deliberation that has led Hans Linde to suggest that the practice 
of initiative and referendum in the Western states at least on oc-
casion violates the "republican form of government" clause in 
Article IV of the Constitution.z4 From one perspective, Califor-
nia is a Jeffersonian's dream,zs even as one suspects (or hopes) 
that it would cause that Virginia eminence the most horrible of 
nightmares. But the question is whether the nightmare would be 
caused by the theory of initiative and referendum or, rather, by 
its practice, which appears to give great advantages to highly in-
tense, well-organized and -financed groups as ag~inst the ordi-
nary mass of the polity. 
My impression-for I quickly confess that I have not suffi-
ciently studied the matter26-is that popular referenda have sup-
planted legislative decisionmaking as the preferred method of 
constitutional change in California and, perhaps, in other West-
em states. I am thus interested in the following question: Imag-
ine that the United States Constitution were like the California 
Constitution, and allowed amendment by popular initiative and 
referendum in addition to the procedures set out by Article V. 
What would the likelihood be that proponents of balanced 
budget or term limits amendments-or, indeed, of any other 
amendment that profoundly changed the political status quo-
would invest in politics of the more-or-less Madisonian variety-
held minority sentiments. A mixed legislative/initiative model would thus be a 
good idea. 
There is certainly something to Volokh's argument, which of course, raises the general 
issue of the relevance of preference intensity within a democratic theory whose one per-
son-one vote standard almost by definition ignores the question of intensity and the jus-
tice of allowing a majority with weak preferences to override a minority with intense 
ones. I presume, incidentally, that those who work to place initiatives on the ballot would 
have very intense feelings regarding the issue, though, obviously, that need not be true of 
those who vote for the proposal once it is on the ballot. 
24. See Hans A. Linde, When Initiative LawTTIIlking is Not "Republican Govern-
ment'': The Campaign Against HomosexUillity, 72 Or. L. Rev. 19 (1993). 
25. It was Jefferson, after all, who advocated frequent reconsideration of constitu-
tional structures, a proposal that drew explicit attack from his close friend James Madison 
in The Federalist No. 49, who instead emphasized the importance of almost literally unre-
flective "veneration." 
26. See, though, Thomas E. Cronin, Direct Democracy: the Politics of Initiative, Ref-
erendum, and Recall (Harvard U. Press, 1989). 
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i.e., focusing on representative government and gaining the re-
quired supermajorities at both national and state levels of poli-
tics-rather than in what might be called plebiscitarian politics-
i.e., focusing on direct, unmediated democracy free of the filters 
provided by representation or of the particular kinds of delibera-
tion fostered by institutional political processes? Given the im-
mense difficulty of amendment through Article V procedures-
to win the "amendment game," for example, one must win the 
approval of two national legislative bodies plus no fewer than 75 
state bodies (assuming that one of them is Nebraska's unicameral 
legislature )-is it not readily predictable that rational agents, es-
pecially as conceived by contemporary public choice theorists, 
would focus their resources on initiatives and referenda? For 
better or worse, recent displays of congressional consideration of 
balanced budget amendments might become a thing of the past, 
as "We the People" instead were summoned to decide about the 
wisdom of constitutionalizing a particular theory of political 
economy. 
That may as yet be only a dim specter on the horizon, but let 
me suggest that one highly thinkable outcome of the frustration 
over failure to gain the final vote needed to propose the balanced 
budget amendment-or of the earlier failure, in the 1970s and 
early '80s, to gain ratification of the Equal Rights Amendment in 
spite of the fact that over 60% of the states, containing an ample 
majority of the population, had given it their assent-will be the 
amendment of Article V itself. The juxtaposition of the ERA 
with the Balanced Budget Amendment should illustrate, inciden-
tally, that dissatisfaction with the requirements of Article V does 
not necessarily assume a particular political coloration. What is 
protected by Article V is the status quo, whether liberal or con-
servative, whether "justice-seeking"z7 or, indeed, justice-
destroying. 
Stephen Griffin has recently suggested that the worst feature 
of the current United States Constitution is indeed Article V, 
precisely because it makes formal change so inordinately diffi-
cult.28 Amendatory change is often masked as "constitutional in-
terpretation," at immense costs in intellectual cogency or candor. 
This also gives to judges both responsibility and power that one 
might well think they are unsuited for, yet another political im-
27. See Lawrence Sager, The Binh Logic of a DemocraJic Constitution (February 9, 
1995) (unpublished). Sager's paper is a ringing defense of the difficulties placed by Arti-
cle V in the way of amendment. 
28. Stephen M. Griffin, The Nominee Is ... Anic/e V, 12 Canst. Comm. 171 (1995). 
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plication of such a rigorous amending clause. Even worse, per-
haps, is that highly desirable change is stifled because one cannot 
in fact figure out an alternative to use of the formal procedures. 
Griffin made his comment in a symposium asking only for 
identification of the worst (or "stupidest") aspect of the Constitu-
tion; it did not ask for positive recommendations as to how to 
cure the suggested defects. But that is clearly the next step for 
anyone who does accept the view that the United States is not 
well served by its amending procedure. One might even make 
the radical suggestion that one might well find desirable alterna-
tives through study of the constitutions of the American States, 
not to mention foreign constitutions, none of which have such 
difficult schemes of amendment. Actually, the sentence above is 
incorrect in one small respect: One country did have a more 
complicated scheme of amendment than that bequeathed us by 
the Philadelphia Convention of 1787. That country was 
Yugoslavia.29 
In any event, I think it is worthwhile to take the next step 
and to imagine what kinds of changes one might advocate for 
Article V, as well as the likely political consequences of any such 
changes. One set of changes might simply involve greater specifi-
cation of answers to a number of important conundrums sug-
gested by our actual political history. The easiest example 
concerns the right of states to rescind their ratification of pro-
posed amendments, at least prior to a declaration by the Na-
tional Archivist that a sufficient number of ratifications has been 
received to make the proposed amendment "part of this Consti-
tution."3o Because the ERA never gained the assent of sufficient 
numbers of states under any theory, we never had to face the 
29. See Lutz, Toward a Theory of Constitutional Amendment at 261 (cited in note 5). 
Lutz developed an "Index of Difficulty" based on the complexities of amending proce-
dures. Yugoslavia's was highest, at 5.60. The United States follows with 5.10. Next come 
Switzerland and Venezuela with 4.75. Austria and Sweden have the "easiest" constitu-
tions to amend, with Rates, respectively, of 0.80 and 1.00. This does not, obviously, in-
clude those few countries that do not have written constitutions, like Great Britain, New 
Zealand, or Israel. 
It would be absurd to argue that the current difficulties of the Balkins are due to the 
formal difficulty of constitutional amendment. Can one, however, be entirely confident, 
in the absence of detailed study, that it played no role at all in making necessary political 
changes, following Tito's death, simply too difficult to realize through ordinary political 
processes? Even if formal constitutional process explains no more than 2% of the vari-
ance in accounting for contemporary South Balkan politics, is that not still a damning 
indictment, unless the rigidity in fact helped to purchase forty years of relative ethnic 
peace during the Tito years? 
30. See Article V. On rescission, see Grover Rees Ill, Comment, Rescinding Ratifi-
cation of Proposed Constitutional Amendments-A Question for the Court, 37 La. L. Rev. 
896 (1977). 
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question of the constitutionality of attempted rescissions by 
Idaho and other states. 
My own view is that a state does indeed have a right to 
change its mind. Imagine that the Balanced Budget Amendment 
had been successfully proposed by Congress, and that several 
states had rushed to ratify it. (Indeed, New Jersey attempted to 
ratify it even before proposal, so eager were the legislators to 
have New Jersey become the first state to endorse it.) Imagine 
also that, like the ERA, it ran into some trouble, and that Demo-
crats scored gains in the 1996 election because the electorate be-
gan to realize the full costs to them of a balanced federal budget 
by 2002. Does one really want to argue that a state should not be 
entitled, as a constitutional matter, to change its collective mind 
on a matter of such profound import? After all, a vote not to 
ratify does not prevent a future legislature from deciding to en-
dorse a proposed amendment. Why does the option to switch 
work in only one direction? Whatever one's views on the merits, 
does one really want to leave this hanging as an open question, to 
be decided either by Congress or the Supreme Court as one's 
jurisprudence dictates?31 The better course, it seems to me, is to 
come to some decision, while there is no amendment pending, 
and to codify it in the Constitution itself. It is true that the 
American way seems to be to await a full-blown crisis before act-
ing, but that scarcely seems to be normatively desirable. 
The most significant failures of Article V to provide any gen-
uine guidance come in regard to the convention that could be 
called on petition of two-thirds of the states. As noted, this is as 
yet only a theoretical problem, but so long as we wish to leave 
open this possibility of a convention, it seems most unwise to 
leave open as well fundamental questions that would be raised by 
any actual convention. Would voting, for example, be by one 
state-one vote, as in Philadelphia, or by individual delegates? 
Would the agenda of the convention be controlled by the peti-
tioning states or by Congress, on the one (actually two) hands, or 
only by choice of the "sovereign" convention itself, on the other? 
As should be obvious, once one gets started, a "corrective" Arti-
cle V devoted only to filling in some of the blanks-and not even 
touching, for example, the basic structure of requiring 
supermajority votes in Congress and ratification by three-
31. See, e.g., Walter Dellinger, The Legitimacy of Constitutional Change: Rethinking 
the Amendment Process, 97 Harv. L. Rev. 386 (1983) (arguing for judicial review of such 
questions); Laurence Tribe, A Constitution We Are Amending: In Defense of a Restrained 
Judicial Role, 97 Harv. L. Rev. 433 (1983) (arguing that Congress has "plenary power" to 
decide on the legitimacy of rescissions). 
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quarters of the states-could well tum out to be almost as long 
as the existing Constitution itself. 
But surely the most fundamental disputes would concern the 
basic structure of Article V. Griffin's complaint is not merely 
that Article V has some lacunae in it, but, rather, that some of 
the ways in which it is all too clear disserve the polity. So what 
direction might amendment of Article V take? 
Would anyone, for example, suggest a process by which na-
tional-level officials alone could amend the Constitution? Con-
sider, for example, a proposal to allow amendment by vote of 
two-thirds of each house of Congress and presidential approval, 
or by vote of three-quarters of each house (in order to prevent, 
for example, an absolute presidential veto of modification of 
presidential power itself). I assume that in fact few of us would 
be tempted by such a proposal, and I assume that what would 
animate most of us in our opposition would indeed be the lack of 
any formal state role and/or the lack of the possibility of popular 
participation as through a referendum. But what underlies that 
mistrust of a national power would, I think, be some version of 
the agency argument. Otherwise, if one's objection to the pres-
ent Article V focuses on its role in preventing vitally needed 
changes, it is hard to see why one would not endorse simply elim-
inating the participation of the states, as by, amendments to be 
proposed by national political institutions-either Congress 
alone or Congress plus President-followed by a popular refer-
endum on whether to ratify the proposals. 
If one rejects such nationalism and endorses continued par-
ticipation by states qua states, that simply forces one to confront 
the question of how many states should have to endorse an 
amendment before it is accepted as part of the Constitution. 
How can anyone seriously defend, in 1995, the present system 
that in essence allows one house of 13 states to block the desires 
of the remaining public? That is, the "amendment game" gives 
victory to those who can win 13 such houses against the side that 
prevails in as many as 86 legislative houses (i.e., both houses in 
37 states and 12 in the remaining 13 states, excluding Nebraska). 
Quite frankly, I can think of no defense for the present rules of 
this particular game unless one is committed simply to making it 
extremely difficult to engage in formal amendment. 
Does an alternative number suggest itself? One possibility, 
obviously, is a simple majority of states. The major problem with 
that is the theoretical possibility that such a majority could be 
gathered by aggregating states that themselves contain substan-
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tially less than a majority of the American public. Is it adequate 
to overcome this fear to point out that any amendment must first 
gain the support of two-thirds of the House of Representatives, 
which is, of course, apportioned on the basis of population? One 
might respond, of course, that the apportionment is scarcely in-
dependent of political factors, ranging from incumbency to race, 
and one might not really believe that the support of two-thirds of 
the Representatives necessarily translates into even majority sup-
port by the public in general. 
Unless one is a "high federalist" in a distinctly modern 
sense-that is, someone who really does accept the metaphysical 
integrity of Idaho qua Idaho, and so on-it seems hard to argue 
that actual population ought not play some role in the ratification 
process. One might well, therefore, adopt a version of the Aus-
tralian rule, which is to require a majority of the states and that 
this majority include a majority of the national population. Note 
well, though, that this allows for the possibility that even if a mi-
nority of states containing a majority of the national population 
supported an amendment that, by stipulation, has gained the ap-
proval of Congress or a national convention, the amendment 
would nevertheless remain unratified. 
At this point, then, we have to ask ourselves why we would 
care that even a majority of states ratify an amendment. The an-
swer, presumably, would be to return to some of the original de-
bates of 1787-88, where one finds rampant mistrust on the part of 
small states in regard to the potential conduct of large states. 
Still, we might ask ourselves why the organization of the Senate, 
based as it is on formal State equality, doesn't offer (more than) 
enough protection to "states qua states." How much protection 
are Wyoming, North Dakota, Alaska, and Rhode Island entitled 
to against the wishes of, say, California, Texas, Florida, and 
Michigan? Is it only the fact that I am a Texan (of sorts) that 
makes me unsympathetic to continuing the remarkable power 
given small states within our political system? 
If one remains justifiably suspicious of exclusive national 
amendment, but is equally suspicious of maintaining the role of 
states in ratification, is an acceptable alternative the national ref-
erendum on amendments first proposed by Congress or by a na-
tional convention? Resistance to this notion could be based on 
fear by, say, people living in Mountain and Upper Midwestern 
states that they would simply be swamped by their fellow citizens 
who have chosen life in the mega-city. But, of course, more fun-
damental objections would be based on some of the earlier-ex-
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pressed fears either about the corrupting role of money in 
politics, including national referendum campaigns, or about the 
unlikelihood that ordinary citizens would think reflectively about 
the kinds of issues appropriate for constitutional placement. 
I have, up to now, been assuming the necessity of a two-
thirds vote in each House of Congress. But why maintain the 
supermajority requirement at all, especially if one maintains a 
sufficiently strong role for states in the ratification process to 
guarantee some kind of barrier against a "rush to judgment"? 
Or, why not require a congressional supermajority only if the 
President formally opposes the proposed amendment? Other-
wise, I'd be inclined to take my chances with congressional ma-
jorities plus presidential approval plus ratification by sufficient 
states to comprise a majority of the population or popular 
ratification. 
I have also been assuming that a constitution establishes a 
single rule for constitutional amendment. There is clearly no ne-
cessity that this be the case, as demonstrated by Article V itself, 
which varies the difficulty of the amendment process with the 
perceived importance of given issues. Thus the drafters of Arti-
cle V explicitly exempted two issues from the general rules re-
garding amendment set out at the beginning of the Article. First, 
a state must consent to its own loss of equal representation in the 
Senate.32 Second, any amendment concerning congressional ab-
olition of the slave trade prior to 1808 appears to have been pre-
cluded. Whatever one might think of these specific precedents, 
the latter one of which certainly points to one of the most horrific 
aspects of the Constitution, they nonetheless point to the possi-
bility of further entrenchment by requiring a more difficult pro-
cess of amendment for things we define as "basic rights of the 
people" than for all other constitutional provisions. 
32. Contrary to what is sometimes asserted, the Senate clause is not "unamendable" 
as a matter of theory, though, as a practical matter, that is almost certainly the case, given 
the extreme unlikelihood of, say, Wyoming agreeing to give up its excess of power in the 
Senate. This assumes, incidentally, that only Wyoming must consent to its reduced repre-
sentation. But, of course, all states would be deprived of "equal Suffrage in the Senate," 
even if one assumes, reasonably enough, that the states that benefit would be delighted to 
accept the inequality. But, as a theoretical matter, this raises the possibility that Ver-
mont's failure to consent to Wyoming's reduced representation in the Senate would doom 
the proposal, since otherwise one would be foisting an "unequal Suffrage" on Vermont, 
relative to Wyoming's, without its consent. There is, of course, no reason to believe that 
any of these theoretical conundrums will actually ever be tested in the crucible of actual 
political decisionmaking. What is even less clear, as a theoretical matter, is whether Arti-
cle V could be amended to change the unanimity requirement by less than a unanimous 
vote. See, e.g., Douglas Linder, What in the Constitution Cannot be Amended?, 23 Ariz. 
L. Rev. 717 (1981). 
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There may be good reason to require very high super-major-
ities before limiting rights of freedom of speech or freedom of 
conscience. Does any such reason suggest itself in regard to term 
limits, whether of legislators or the President, or, for that matter, 
to any other structural feature of the Constitution? For me the 
question is rhetorical, for I can think of no good reasons to sup-
port the formal stasis engendered by Article V. No doubt the 
adoption of such a two-tier system would lead to significant 
wrangling about what might count as a "basic right," but such 
wrangling seems a small price to pay for what would be a distinct 
improvement in overall constitutional design and the increased 
possibility of cogently responding to significant structural 
imperfections. 
Ultimately, though, all such discussions take us back to our 
simplistic, but not, I hope, simple-minded, models outlined at the 
beginning of this essay. That is, to what extent do we first ac-
knowledge the possibility of imperfection and then have faith in 
our fellow citizens to respond adequately to such imperfections? 
Our answers to these questions, whether we are conscious of 
them or not, ultimately dictate where along the spectrum of pos-
sibilities we choose to place (and defend) our own procedures for 
constitutional amendment. As we embark on what appears to be 
some fundamental rethinking of certain premises of American 
government, we could do far worse than reflecting on the possi-
bility that the existing amendment process found in Article V is 
itself one of the most basic imperfections in our scheme of 
governance. 
